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Brown v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 113 (December 28, 2017)1
CRIMINAL: WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Summary
The Court clarified the definition of an indigent person and the demonstration of need
sufficient required for an indigent person’s request for defense services. The Court additionally
held that Widdis v. Second Judicial Dist. Court does not require an indigent defendant to request
a sum certain before the consideration or granting of a motion for defense services at public
expense.
Background
The petitioner, Willis Brown, faced multiple counts of lewdness with a child. Prior to his
preliminary hearing, Brown moved for expert services pursuant to Widdis v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court,2 and submitted a financial information application along with his motion. The justice court
found Brown indigent and granted the motion, but limited the funds available for services to a
stated amount.
Brown again filed a motion for expert services at public expense, updating his financial
information to show the district court he gained employment and reduced monthly liabilities since
his earlier motion. The motion requested the district court declare him indigent and permit the
retention of an investigator and expert at State expense to assist his defense, and disclosed that
Brown’s extended family paid for his legal fees. At the motion hearing, the district court concluded
he no longer qualified as indigent based on his updated information.
After this Court ordered an answer to Brown’s petition, the district court held a hearing to
expound its reasons for denying Brown’s motion. The court referred to two requirements in
Widdis, indigency and necessity of services, and implied a third requirement from the Widdis
dissent, a request for a sum certain. The court deduced that Brown had financial resources after
exhausting his family resources to retain counsel and the significant increase in Brown’s debt-toincome ratio between the submission of the two applications. The district court denied Brown’s
motion for expert services at public expense. This petition followed.
Discussion
The Court has complete discretion to consider a writ of mandamus; generally, such a writ
will not issue if the petitioner has a “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.”3 The Court
elected to exercise their discretion and consider Brown’s petition in the interest of the judicial
efficiency and to “control a manifest abuse or capricious exercise of discretion,”4 notwithstanding
a remedy at law available to Brown by way of an appeal should a conviction occur.5
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Widdis establishes a duty to the State to “provide reasonable and necessary defense services
at public expense to indigent criminal defendants”6 when criminal defendants demonstrate
indigency and a need for services. The Widdis court adopted an analytical framework holding that
“the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel provided authority for the payment
requested by the defendant."7 Accordingly, the right to receive funds for defense services at public
expense was entwined with the right to effective assistance of counsel.8 Other courts agree, even
when a defendant does not have appointed counsel.9
The standard for determining indigency is whether a person "is unable, without substantial
hardship to himself or his dependents, to obtain competent, qualified legal counsel on his or her
own."10 Defendants who do not meet a presumptive threshold of substantial hardship are
“subjected to a more rigorous screening process to determine if their particular circumstances,
including seriousness of charges being faced, monthly expenses, and local private counsel rates,
would result in a substantial hardship."11 Widdis connects the right to defense services at public
expense to the right to effective assistance; accordingly, the standard for determining indigency
for the appointment of counsel established by In the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning
Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases12 should be
used when determining indigency under Widdis.
The Court rejected the district court’s holding because its reasoning worked against the
logic the Court used in Widdis13 by discouraging criminal defendants from improving their
financial situation and as such, was a misreading of the first prong. The district court concluded
that Brown was no longer indigent because his financial situation improved since the justice court
found him indigent. The Court has previously held there is no requirement that a person be
"entirely destitute and without funds" when determining indigency.14 Though Brown had shown
financial improvement, he presented additional documentation showing he had minimal assets to
cover basic necessities and a negatively disproportionate debt-to-income ratio. The district court
“capriciously exercised its discretion” by finding Brown was no longer indigent given the
circumstances or, in other words, finding Brown could afford an investigator and/or an expert
without considerable hardship.
The Court concluded that the district court clearly abused its discretion when it determined
that Brown made a cursory showing of need under the second prong of Widdis. Both an expert and
an investigator were reasonably necessary to Brown’s defense, establishing a demonstration of
need as required by the second prong, particularly in a trial involving accusations of lewdness with
a child.
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The Court disagreed with the district court’s finding that a petitioner’s failure to request a
sum certain is fatal to a motion for expert services. The district court suggested the dissent in
Widdis created a third prong requiring the request of a sum certain before a court may grant a
motion for expert service. Accordingly, the district court’s reliance on Brown’s failure to request
a sum certain was an unsuitable reason to deny the motion. If it was truly concerned with the cost
of services, the district court could have taken judicious measures to reasonably limit expenditures.
Conclusion
The Court granted Brown’s petition in part based on the district court’s capricious exercise
and clear abuse of discretion when it denied Brown’s motion for expert services at public expense.
Accordingly, the Court directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the
district court to vacate its order denying Brown’s motion and to reconsider the motion consistent
with this opinion.

3

